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INTRODUCTION
The aim of this article is to discuss whether the political thought of late
eighteenth-century British philosopher William Godwin—as expressed in
his best known work, the Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, published in
three different editions during the 1790s—is best described as utilitarian.2
The significance of this issue and its resolution is threefold. First, it is impor-
tant within Godwin scholarship, especially as once popular utilitarian read-
ings of his thought have been discredited in recent years. My objective in
what follows is to go some way towards a rehabilitation of the utilitar-
ian reading. Second, attention to this issue informs understandings of late
eighteenth-century utilitarianism, which is important given the disputes
among historians about both the origins of the tradition and which individ-
ual thinkers can be deemed to have assisted in its development. Thirdly, it
speaks to a methodological problem in the history of ideas because ascribing
1 A much earlier version of this paper was presented to the British Society for Eighteenth
Century Studies Conference at St. Hugh’s College, Oxford in January 2006. I am grate-
ful to the audience there, to the JHI referees, and especially to Dario Castiglione, Iain
Hampsher-Monk, and Mark Philp for comments and criticism. I worked it up to its
current form, under ideal conditions, while a visiting scholar at University of California,
Berkeley’s Center for British Studies in Autumn 2007 and I thank Mark Bevir and James
Vernon for hosting me.
2 William Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Modern
Morals and Happiness , ed. Isaac Kramnick (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976 [1798]).
Though currently out of print, this edition remains the most easily accessible.
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a utilitarian moral theory to Godwin involves a rejection of the claim, asso-
ciated with the work of Quentin Skinner, that we cannot ascribe to past
thinkers concepts that they lack the linguistic means to express.
I begin by noting that even though utilitarianism is not particularly
difficult to define as a moral theory, the precise nature of its history is a
matter of some dispute, with a number of different writers linked to its
inception. I then concentrate on the question of the identity of Godwin’s
Political Justice, introducing first the textual evidence that would seem to
vindicate a utilitarian interpretation and second, the increasingly popular
case against such an interpretation. I distinguish two different arguments
against a utilitarian reading. The first is based on Godwin’s non-hedonistic
account of human happiness, which I argue does not threaten his claim to
be part of the utilitarian tradition because it posits an unjustifiably narrow
view of the essential characteristics of a utilitarian theory. The second is
based on a contextualist concern about the problem of prolepsis: that God-
win could not have intended to contribute to a tradition of non-hedonistic
utilitarianism that did not yet exist and I argue that this worry relies ulti-
mately on an erroneous understanding of historical meaning.
THE HISTORY OF UTILITARIANISM
As an approach to moral and political philosophy, utilitarianism does not
seem especially hard to define. There are certainly different justifications
available for the approach. As Will Kymlicka observes, utilitarian theories
can be ultimately reducible to justificatory foundations that are either egali-
tarian or teleological and these foundations reflect substantively different
moral concerns.3 However, between any two utilitarian theories with diver-
gent justifications, there remains a recognizable commonality: the moral or
political end of both theories is the promotion of ‘‘utility.’’ Utility does not
of course mean the same thing in every moral theory. Indeed, it can repre-
sent any one of a number of values, including ‘‘pleasure,’’ ‘‘happiness,’’
‘‘desire-satisfaction,’’ and ‘‘welfare.’’ But what all utilitarian theories have
in common is each regards the generation of utility as the measure of a
morally correct individual act (or political rule).
This definitive feature of utilitarian moral theories would seem to make
them rather easy to identify. And yet the precise history of utilitarianism as
a tradition in moral philosophy is far from straightforward. There is no
3 Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1991), 30–35.
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clear point of agreement over its inception as the rival claims of a number
of interested parties show. In his celebrated essay on the subject, John Stuart
Mill suggests that it is a doctrine with a demonstrably ancient lineage. He
cites Plato’s documented discussion between Socrates and Protagoras as a
clash of ‘‘the theory of utilitarianism against the popular morality of the
so-called sophist.’’4 Elsewhere Mill identifies the history of utilitarian
thought as a progression all the way from ‘‘Epicurus to Bentham.’’5
It is of course Jeremy Bentham who is customarily regarded as the phil-
osophical founder of the doctrine, and as the writer who first systematized
utilitarianism as a comprehensive approach to moral and political questions
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. His version had both
psychological and normative components. Individual moral agents are, ac-
cording to Bentham, subject to two ‘‘sovereign masters,’’ pain and pleasure,
and are psychologically predisposed to seek the latter and avoid the former.
At the same time, individuals, morally speaking, should seek to maximize
pleasure and it then follows from this that the role of the state is to ensure
the ‘‘greatest happiness for the greatest number.’’ Bentham’s An Introduc-
tion to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, which introduced the util-
ity principle, was published in 1789, a mere four years prior to the first
edition of Godwin’s Political Justice.
Given the fact that the two were contemporaries, one obvious way
of establishing Godwin’s utilitarian credentials would be to identify some
intellectual link between his own writing and that of Bentham. Such a link
has been suggested by Don Locke, for instance, who claims that Godwin
‘‘read and ignored [Bentham] while writing Political Justice’s first edition.’’6
Locke, however, fails to provide any evidence to support his claim about
Godwin having read Bentham and it seems unlikely to have been the case.
Godwin was not shy about revealing his intellectual influences in Political
Justice and though he cites Aristotle, Berkeley, Beccaria, Hutcheson, Rous-
seau, Hume, Burke, Paine, and others, he makes no mention of Bentham.
Nor does he appear prominently in Godwin’s meticulously maintained
diary entries for the period of composition of that work and was never
part of his social ‘‘circle.’’7 This is not in fact surprising, since Bentham’s
4 J. S. Mill, ‘‘Utilitarianism,’’ Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, ed. J. M. Robson,
Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 10:
205.
5 Ibid, 209.
6 Don Locke, A Fantasy of Reason: The Life and Thought of William Godwin (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), 172.
7 See Mark Philp, Godwin’s Political Justice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986) espe-
cially the appendices.
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Introduction was actually not widely read until well after the publication
of Political Justice.
Bentham’s utilitarian political philosophy, though obviously innova-
tive in its systematic nature, clearly did not emerge from nowhere and it is
widely accepted by scholars that some sort of utilitarian thought did exist
prior to his writings, though there remains no consensus over any point of
inception. For example, Sidgwick’s Outlines of the History of Ethics locates
the emergence of utilitarianism with Shaftesbury’s An Inquiry Concerning
Virtue and Merit, published in 1711. John Rawls, by contrast, describes
Sidgwick’s selection of Shaftesbury as made ‘‘somewhat arbitrarily’’ and
suggests instead that it is Francis Hutcheson that ‘‘seems to have been the
first to state quite clearly the principle of utility’’ through his argument that
‘‘that action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest
numbers; and that, worst, which, in like manner, occasions misery.’’8
Those who have attempted to chart recent histories of utilitarian
thought have been no more certain of its origins. Frederick Rosen has sug-
gested that Hume’s sustained use of ‘‘utility’’ as a concept in his Enquiry
Concerning the Principles of Morals is sufficiently significant both on its
own terms and for its influence over Bentham for Hume to be described as
the first ‘‘classical’’ utilitarian.9 Yet Rosen also acknowledges the lack of
scholarly ‘‘agreement about what, if anything, being a utilitarian meant in
the eighteenth century.’’10 Other histories of utilitarianism written in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such as those offered by Leslie Stephen,
E´lie Hale´vy, and John Plamenatz, offer a vision of the philosophy as some-
thing like an all-encompassing ideology, one that was not merely available
to late eighteenth-century philosophers, but was seemingly unavoidable.11
For example, according to Hale´vy’s account, in the 1790s
Alongside of Bentham, and independently of him, [utilitarianism]
was developing, and was being transformed and continually en-
8 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 20.
9 Frederick Rosen, Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill (London: Routledge,
2003). See Knud Haakonssen, The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of
David Hume and Adam Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and
Nicholas Capaldi, Hume’s Place in Moral Philosophy (New York: Peter Lang, 1992) for
rejections of the claim that Hume can convincingly be read as part of the utilitarian
tradition.
10 Rosen, Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill, 3.
11 Leslie Stephen, The English Utilitarians (London: Duckworth, 1900); E´lie Hale´vy, The
Growth of Philosophic Radicalism (London: Faber and Faber, 1952); John Plamenatz,
The English Utilitarians (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958).
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riched by new principles. . . . Burke, Mackintosh, Paine, Godwin
and Malthus contributed to it in works have remained classical.
Now all these men, to whatever party they might belong, Godwin
no less than Burke, Malthus no less than Godwin, were supporters
of the principle of utility. It is clear that the doctrine of utility was
becoming the universal philosophy in England.12
Hale´vy’s thesis is clear: utilitarianism was the ‘‘universal philosophy’’ of
the late eighteenth century and virtually every thinker writing at that time
invoked it in some form or another.
Yet such an approach seems to be wrong-headed unless the ‘‘principle
of utility’’ in question is to lose all its meaning. To pick just one example,
the political theories advanced by Burke on the one hand and Godwin on
the other are completely divergent in almost every respect. A distinction
is therefore required between the mere rhetorical deployment of the term
‘‘utility’’ and its systematic usage within a discernible utilitarian political
theory unless the term is to lose its significance. As Mark Philp observes,
unlike the ‘‘exacting standards of precision’’ associated with modern philo-
sophical utilitarianism,
In the late eighteenth century, except in the pages of Bentham
whose readership was very limited, utility was by no means a sin-
gle principle by which to judge all acts; to appeal to utility was
merely to claim that if an institution was to be justified it had to
be shown that it furthered people’s interests.13
Clearly, then, in order for a thinker to be considered a utilitarian, it is not
enough that that person invokes the concept of ‘‘utility.’’ It seems that a
thinker must go much further, and, like Bentham, systematically apply the
principle to moral and political reasoning. The crucial question to be ad-
dressed here, then, is whether Godwin does so in Political Justice.
THE CASE FOR A UTILITARIAN INTERPRETATION:
HAPPINESS AS THE FOUNDATION AND END OF
MORALITY IN POLITICAL JUSTICE
The foundations of Godwin’s moral philosophy are partly revealed in the
reasons he gives for rejecting rival theories. One such theory is the social
12 Hale´vy, Philosophic Radicalism, 153–54.
13 Philp, Godwin’s Political Justice, 72.
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contract tradition and its location of political right in the obligations that
arise from a compact between individuals. The aspect of the social contract
tradition that Godwin is keenest to reject is its view that the act of promis-
ing is of moral significance. ‘‘It is not,’’ Godwin explains, ‘‘because I have
promised that I am bound to do that for my neighbour which will be bene-
ficial to him and not injurious to me.’’14 Rather, he claims that the ‘‘only’’
basis for keeping our promises is that doing so ‘‘tends to the welfare of
intelligent beings.’’15 This entails that we must also break our promises
whenever doing so will generate more ‘‘welfare’’ than keeping them. God-
win also rejects the possibility that individuals might have any discretionary
entitlement to keep their promises in ordinary or mundane circumstances
on the grounds that such ordinary circumstances simply do not exist: ‘‘there
is nothing which is truly indifferent’’ because ‘‘all things in the universe are
connected together.’’16 Unlike social contract theorists, for Godwin, ‘‘the
foundation of morality is justice’’ and the ‘‘criterion’’ of justice is ‘‘the in-
fluence my conduct will have upon the stock of general good.’’17 Godwin
explicitly states that,
Pleasure and pain, happiness and misery, constitute the whole ulti-
mate subject of moral enquiry. There is nothing desirable but the
obtaining of the one and the avoiding of the other. All the re-
searches of human imagination cannot add a single article to this
summary of good. Hence it follows that wherever pain exists,
there is an evil. Were it otherwise, there would be no such thing as
evil. If pain in one individual be not an evil, then it would not be
an evil for pain to be felt by every individual that exists, and for-
ever. The universe is no more than a collection of individuals.18
The basis of morality is thus the capacity for ‘‘individuals’’ to experience
pleasure and pain; the former is good and is to be pursued whereas the
latter is an evil to be avoided.
The promotion of pleasure and avoidance of pain clearly represents the
foundation and end of morality for Godwin. This is made plain in the very
first of the ‘‘summary of principles’’—added to the third edition of Political
Justice—which states that ‘‘the true object of moral and political disquisi-
14 Godwin, Political Justice, 217.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid, 219.
17 Ibid, 217–18.
18 Ibid, 221.
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tion is pleasure or happiness.’’19 ‘‘Morality’’ is, for Godwin, as he later puts
it, ‘‘nothing else but a calculation of consequences’’ and alternative ethical
schemes, such as those that demand individuals to ‘‘do our duty without
regard to consequences,’’ are ‘‘completely absurd and self-contradictory.’’20
A morally worthy action is simply one that produces more pleasure than
pain. This is the reason why the belief that promises somehow represent
the foundation of morality is more than merely mistaken; such a belief is
actually pernicious, since it inevitably ignores our duties to promote happi-
ness. For Godwin, ‘‘It may be my duty to relieve, upon some occasions, the
wretchedness of my neighbour’’ rather than settle a debt I had promised to
honor.21
There are no limits to the demands of morality for Godwin. ‘‘I am,’’ he
asserts, ‘‘bound to employ my talents, my understanding, my strength and
my time, for the production of the greatest quantity of general good.’’22
‘‘Everything in my power’’ is bound to the ‘‘general weal.’’23 Since our obli-
gations are defined by our ‘‘power,’’ this rules out any geographical or rela-
tional limitations to our moral duties and individuals are obliged to act to
maximize human happiness whenever they are able to do so. This belief
informed his argument that in situations of extreme moral emergency, we
must act with strict impartiality, even when this entails the sacrifice of our
loved ones at the expense of the greater good.24 This impartiality also ap-
plies to our own life and thus in ‘‘extraordinary’’ cases, in which ‘‘I can
promote the general good by my death more than by my life, justice re-
quires that I be content to die.’’25 The legitimacy of an act of suicide is a
matter of calculation: it is only permissible as long as it will promote the
general good.26
In Political Justice, Godwin uses the terms ‘‘pleasure,’’ ‘‘happiness,’’
‘‘good,’’ and ‘‘utility’’ interchangeably. But what exactly does he mean by
them? The best definitions can be found in his chapter ‘‘On Good and
Evil.’’27 Herein, he claims that
19 Ibid, 75.
20 Ibid, 322.
21 Ibid, 226.
22 Ibid, 175.
23 Ibid, 174.
24 For accounts of this aspect of Godwin’s thought, see D. H. Monro, Godwin’s Moral
Philosophy: An Interpretation of William Godwin (Oxford, 1953), 9–35; and Robert
Lamb ‘‘The Foundations of Godwinian Impartiality,’’ Utilitas 18 (2006): 134–53.
25 Godwin, Political Justice, 174.
26 Ibid, 177–78.
27 Ibid, 389–406.
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Good is a general name, including pleasure, and the means by
which pleasure is procured. Evil is a general name, including pain,
and the means by which pain is produced. Of the two things in-
cluded in these general names, the first is cardinal and substantive,
the second has no intrinsic recommendations, but depends for its
value on the other. Pleasure therefore is to be termed an absolute
good; the means of pleasure are only relatively good.28
This passage provides strong evidence of the utilitarian foundations of
Godwin’s thought; particularly the claim that pleasure is an end in itself,
an ‘‘absolute good,’’ whereas the means to achieving pleasure are of only
instrumental importance.
A HIERARCHY OF HAPPINESS
In his ‘‘summary of principles,’’ Godwin makes an explicit and very impor-
tant distinction between qualitatively different ‘‘classes’’ of human plea-
sures: ‘‘primary’’ and ‘‘secondary.’’ The ‘‘primary’’ class comprises ‘‘the
external pleasures of the external senses.’’ He then goes on to explain that
In addition to these, man is susceptible of certain secondary plea-
sures, as the pleasures of intellectual feeling, the pleasures of sym-
pathy, and the pleasures of self-approbation. The secondary
pleasures are probably more exquisite than the primary: Or, at
least, the most desirable state of man is that in which he has access
to all these sources of pleasure, and is in possession of a happiness
the most varied and uninterrupted. This state is a state of high
civilization.29
This differentiation of primary and secondary forms of pleasure is very im-
portant and distinguishes Godwin’s idea of happiness from that of Ben-
tham, for whom pleasure is relative to the individual and is measured in the
quantity of pleasure it generates, a sentiment captured in Bentham’s reputed
remark that playing pushpin can be of as much value as reading poetry. For
Godwin, by contrast, internal pleasures such as that of intellectual feeling,
sympathy, and self-approbation are intrinsically superior to sensual plea-
28 Ibid, 390.
29 Ibid, 75.
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sures. Thus, presumably pushpin is qualitatively inferior to poetry no mat-
ter how much an individual agent happens to enjoy it. ‘‘Sensual pleasures,’’
though still valuable are ‘‘momentary’’ and because of this ‘‘fill a very short
portion of our time with enjoyment, and leave long intervals of painful
vacuity.’’30
Godwin reveals his intellectual debts to the Epicurean tradition, and
approvingly cites its belief that pleasure is the ‘‘supreme good’’ for humans.
But, in his view, the mistake of this tradition of thought lay in its individual-
ism: its treatment of pleasure as subjective to the individual agent, with
whom it located the appraisal of an ethical action. Thus, the ‘‘error’’ of the
Epicureans lay ‘‘in confining that pleasure which is the proper scope of
human actions to the pleasure of the individual who acts, and not admitting
that the pleasure of others was an object which, for its own sake, could,
and ought to be pursued.’’31 What the Epicureans correctly observed, then,
was the basic foundation for their philosophy, the commitment to the belief
that ‘‘pleasure is the supreme good,’’ something which ‘‘cannot be denied
by him who is sufficiently attentive to the meaning of the word.’’32 But the
problem with the agent-relative utilitarianism that they advanced is that it
licenses any sort of behavior that is pleasurable to the individual, even that
which is harmful to others.33 Godwin is quite unequivocal in his support for
an objective standard of pleasure on the grounds that, despite differences in
education and personal circumstances, there remains ‘‘a common [human]
nature, and that common nature ought to be consulted’’34 when assessing
moral values.
In the chapter ‘‘On Good and Evil,’’ Godwin further delineates his
hierarchy of pleasures through a ‘‘scale of happiness,’’ which ranks social
groups into classes on this basis. The ‘‘first class,’’ which enjoys only the
basest form of happiness, is made up of manual laborers. Thus,
We will conceive a man working with his hands every day to ob-
tain his subsistence. He rises early to his labour, and leaves off
every night weary and exhausted. He takes a tranquil or a boister-
ous refreshment, and spends the hours of darkness in uninter-
rupted slumber . . . his cares are few, as he has scarcely known the
pressure of absolute want. . . . The range of his ideas is scanty; and
30 Ibid, 300.
31 Ibid, 391.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid, 391–92.
34 Ibid, 392.
127
JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS ✦ JANUARY 2009
the general train of his sensations comes as near as the nature of
human existence will admit to the region of indifference. This man
is in a certain sense happy. He is happier than a stone.35
The sort of pleasure experienced by this individual is of little importance to
Godwin, even if the individual in question considers himself to have
‘‘scarcely known the pressure of absolute want.’’ A contrast is then drawn
between the life of this aforementioned laborer and the next on the scale,
the hedonistic man ‘‘of rank, fortune and dissipation.’’ This person enjoys
‘‘all the luxuries of the palate’’ and ‘‘with a happy flow of spirits and a
perpetual variety of amusement . . . is almost a stranger to ennui.’’36 The
individual from this class clearly seems quite happy. But it is not only the
case that this individual thinks himself happy in the same way as the laborer
does. Indeed, he actually is happy on Godwin’s definition of the term: his
life is full of pleasure. However, Godwin again rejects the pleasure of the
man of rank and fortune and does so almost as forcefully as that of the
laborer. This is because even though the man of fortune is ‘‘happier than
the peasant,’’ he remains a ‘‘model of ignorance’’ and ‘‘rarely thinks of
anything beyond himself.’’37 The man of rank is clearly happier than the
laborer because he experiences more pleasures; but these are merely plea-
sures of the external senses and the value of these primary pleasures are
automatically negated by the disutility caused by the lack of secondary
pleasures.
The representative of the third class Godwin introduces is ‘‘the man of
taste and liberal accomplishments,’’ who is described as a philosopher or
poet, one who will be ‘‘recollected with pleasure, and extolled with ardour,
by generations yet unborn.’’38 This individual is capable of a more sophisti-
cated level of happiness than either of the previous two, who in their indi-
vidual tastes ‘‘were only a better sort of brutes.’’39 The man of taste has
access to an overbalance of secondary pleasures, but is still not quite at the
highest point of the scale. At this highest point is ‘‘the man of benevolence’’
and ‘‘exalted generosity,’’ who is aware that ‘‘there is no true joy but in the
spectacle and contemplation of happiness’’ and that the ‘‘highest’’ of
human pleasures are ‘‘the pleasures of disinterestedness.’’40 The happiness
35 Ibid, 393.
36 Ibid, 393–94.
37 Ibid, 394.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid, 395.
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experienced by the benevolent person that acts in a virtuous manner—and
Godwin defines a virtuous action in utilitarian terms, as one that has the
‘‘tendency to contribute to general happiness’’41—is therefore more valu-
able than that experienced by someone who acts in a hedonistic manner.
THE CASE AGAINST A UTILITARIAN INTERPRETATION:
(1) THE ARGUMENT FROM NON-HEDONISM
So, to recap: for Godwin, the foundation and end of morality is the promo-
tion of pleasure and the avoidance of pain; the scope of morality is very
extensive, such that each of our actions are subject to moral assessment and
we are obliged to do everything in our power to promote the general good;
and there is an objective and qualitative definition of what constitutes
human pleasure. Given this account of Godwin’s moral philosophy, it is
not surprising that many have interpreted him as a utilitarian thinker. In
fact, he has occasionally been presented as the most thoroughgoing utilitar-
ian philosopher in its history. Leslie Stephen, for example, describes him as
an ‘‘ultra-utilitarian.’’42
As noted earlier, the histories of utilitarianism written in the twentieth
century by Stephen, Hale´vy, and Plamenatz, all include Godwin as a key
figure in their accounts. But such a utilitarian interpretation of Political
Justice has not been confined to large-scale historical narratives; it has also
proved popular within specialized accounts of Godwin’s thought. D. H.
Monro, for example, asserts that ‘‘Godwin was not a confused and half-
hearted utilitarian, but an exceptionally clear-sighted one, who has been
much neglected by the historians of utilitarianism.’’43 In The Philosophical
Anarchism of William Godwin, John Clark suggests that,
Godwin’s ethical, social, and political philosophy are grounded in
a form of hedonistic utilitarianism. . . . Utility is the guiding princi-
ple of his entire moral philosophy and is the criterion which he sets
up for all ethical and political decision making. . . . For Godwin,
‘‘political justice’’ is equivalent in meaning to social utility.44
41 Ibid, 185.
42 Stephen, The English Utilitarians, 231.
43 Monro, Godwin’s Moral Philosophy, 15.
44 J. P. Clark, The Philosophical Anarchism of William Godwin (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1977), 93–4.
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Peter Marshall has further claimed that ‘‘in his ethics, Godwin is a thor-
oughgoing utilitarian’’45 and any ‘‘departures from utilitarianism are more
apparent than real.’’46 And Don Locke’s conclusion is that Godwin is a
‘‘classic Utilitarian, at one with Bentham and with Mill.’’47 Given the abun-
dance of textual evidence supporting a utilitarian reading of Political Justice
and the ubiquity of this interpretation, there would seem to be no question
about Godwin’s claim to be part of this philosophical tradition.
However, though once the dominant reading of Godwin’s best-known
philosophical work, the utilitarian interpretation has been subject to sig-
nificant criticism in recent years. The two figures that have marshalled the
most noteworthy cases against a utilitarian interpretation of Godwin are
F. E. L. Priestly (in the introduction to his edition of Political Justice) and
Mark Philp (in Godwin’s Political Justice).48 Priestly’s argument stems from
his observation that
The language of utility was almost inescapable for a writer of God-
win’s generation. Consequently, we find Godwin accepting the
doctrine that pleasure and pain are the only absolute good and
evil, and from time to time subordinating various virtues to utility,
insisting they have value only as a means to pleasure.49
He then concludes that ‘‘the phrases of utility in Godwin are merely verbal
substitutions for the Christian duties of self-denial and love of one’s neigh-
bour.’’50 However, since Godwin considers and rejects outright, the Chris-
tian commitment to loving one’s neighbor in Book II of Political Justice, the
notion that the term ‘‘utility’’ merely functions as a substitute for it can be
dismissed as unsustainable.51 That said, Priestly is here offering two serious
and specific objections to a utilitarian reading of Political Justice.
First, he suggests that such an interpretation is misleading because the
phrase ‘‘utility’’ had a much more general meaning in the eighteenth cen-
tury than today: its use was ‘‘inescapable.’’ The claim is not just that the
45 Peter Marshall, William Godwin (London: Yale University Press, 1984), 98.
46 Ibid, 103.
47 Locke, A Fantasy of Reason, 172–73.
48 See also William Stafford, ‘‘Dissenting Religion Translated into Politics: Godwin’s Po-
litical Justice,’’ History of Political Thought 1 (1980): 279–99.
49 F. E. L. Priestly, ‘‘Critical Introduction,’’ Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its
Influence on Morals and Happiness (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1946), 15.
50 Ibid, 22.
51 Godwin, Political Justice, 169.
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term ‘‘utility’’ was everywhere; it is that in being everywhere, the term is
bereft of any real meaning and is certainly removed from its modern con-
ceptual incarnation. Thus, whilst it appears to modern readers as Godwin’s
fundamental philosophical commitment, it is just that, an appearance,
made inevitable by the rhetorical conventions of the time. As the earlier
discussion should make clear, Priestly does have a point. The term ‘‘utility’’
was very widely used by eighteenth century thinkers, so much in fact that
there is considerable disagreement over of the exact origin of the modern
doctrine of utilitarianism and who can subsequently be regarded as its ad-
herents. As intimated above, the historical accounts of scholars such as Ha-
le´vy seem to have ignored the problems posed by this wide usage and have
reached the erroneous conclusion that it was a ‘‘universal philosophy’’
shared as much by Burke as Bentham.
However, the analysis of Godwin’s foundational moral beliefs above
(and the supporting textual evidence) should be enough to reject Priestly’s
claim about the ubiquity of ‘‘utility’’ and its relevance for understanding
Political Justice. Although, the term ‘‘utility’’ was indeed difficult to escape,
it was not impossible to do so; after all, not every late eighteenth century
thinker did use it. More importantly, as hinted at earlier, there is an obvious
difference between: (1) those thinkers who simply use the term; (2) those
who use it in a systematic manner to invoke a concept that can be equated
with human pleasure or happiness; and (3) those who use the concept as
the foundational principle of their moral theories. As shown, Godwin’s Po-
litical Justice reveals not only (1) but also uses (2) and (3) and it is this that
marks his thought out from a writer like Burke, who might fit the criteria
of (1) but not (2) or (3). Godwin clearly deploys utility in a systematic
manner (or at least believed he did) and evidently makes it the foundation
and end of his moral arguments. Consider the following passage:
. . . there is no action of our lives which does not in some way
affect that happiness. Our property, our time, and our faculties
may all of them be made to contribute to this end. . . . There is not
one of our avocations or amusements that does not, by its effects,
render us more or less fit to contribute our quota to the general
utility.52
Here Godwin could not be more explicit: ‘‘happiness,’’ which is the ‘‘end’’
of morality, means the same thing as ‘‘general utility.’’ There is no evidence
52 Ibid, 192.
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to suggest that this equation is carelessness on Godwin’s part or that he
means something other than what he says: any argument to this effect is
simply unsustainable when confronted with the text.
The second objection that Priestly provides to demonstrate Godwin’s
non-utilitarianism is that he
. . . overturns the whole utilitarian scheme by introducing a quali-
tative sense of pleasures, by depreciating the strength and value of
the direct pleasures of the senses, and by insisting that the highest
pleasure is to be found only through the pursuit of virtue. In all
this he is akin to Price and to the writers of the Moral Sense school,
who insist on the pleasures of self-approbation and disinterested-
ness, and deny the supremacy of the pleasures.53
Priestly’s second argument actually seems incompatible with his first: if util-
ity is merely a verbal substitution for the Christian Golden Rule, then it
cannot also mean pleasure. But even if this second point is considered alone,
it is ultimately unconvincing. The argument is that Godwin cannot be con-
sidered a utilitarian thinker because he departs from Bentham’s hedonistic
conception of happiness. Whereas Bentham leaves calculations of pleasure
to be construed ultimately in terms of its quantity, Godwin does not, and
therefore, according to Priestly, cannot be considered to be a utilitarian.
His scale of happiness shows that pleasure is measurable only in qualitative
and non-hedonistic terms: the benevolent agent is automatically happier
than those further down the hierarchy of pleasure. It would have to be for
him to be able to argue that there are secondary pleasures (of intellectual
feeling, sympathy and self-approbation) and that these are superior to pri-
mary pleasures (of the external senses). Though both are pleasures—and
are therefore to be desired—equal quantities of secondary and primary vari-
ants are not equally worthy: in fact, the two are in some sense incommensu-
rable.
The understanding of pleasure or happiness outlined in Political Justice
is undeniably qualitative rather than quantitative. But it need not follow
from this that this qualitative understanding demonstrates the ‘‘overturn-
ing’’ of utilitarianism. This would only be the case if the proposition that
only hedonistic moral theories are describable as utilitarian held true. But
such a narrow definition of utilitarianism seems unwarranted. The only
way to sustain this definition would be to ascribe to utilitarian theories
53 Priestly, ‘‘Critical Introduction,’’ 15.
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hedonism as an essential characteristic. Yet there seems nothing to justify
this: utilitarianism is and has always been a complex philosophical doctrine
and such essentialism can only serve to mask this complexity. Such a defini-
tion would seem to be dubious historically, as it would appear to posit
ahistorical characteristics to an approach to moral and political philosophy
that underwent significant historical development. The definition would
also act to exclude utilitarians that are not strict hedonists. Thus, it would
inevitably require the exclusion of John Stuart Mill from the utilitarian tra-
dition of which he clearly thought he was part. It is not clear whether Mill
believed he was offering a substantial reformulation of utilitarianism or
merely was (as he claimed to be) making explicit aspects of the theory that
had always been implicit, but his well-known argument is that the doctrine
recognizes a qualitative distinction between kinds of pleasure; that some
pleasures are more valuable than others.54 It is because of this that Mill can
assert in decidedly Godwinian parlance that
. . . no intelligent being would consent to be a fool . . . even though
they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is
better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.55
The same thought that drives Mill’s well-known contention that it is ‘‘better
to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied’’ underpins Godwin’s claim
that ‘‘no comparison can be made between the virtue of Socrates, and that
of a Hottentot or a Siberian.’’56
Both Godwin and Mill defend a form of utilitarianism with a qualita-
tive conception of happiness. But to imply that the existence of this qualita-
tive element ‘‘overturns’’ the core elements of the theory seems wrong,
because it relies on an unjustifiably essentialist understanding of what it
means to be a utilitarian. To claim that this essentialist understanding of
what it means to be a utilitarian is unwarranted is, it should be stressed,
not to claim that utilitarian theories do not have some essential characteris-
tics. It is rather to suggest that a broader understanding of the essential
characteristics as the belief that the promotion of human pleasure (and cor-
responding minimization of human pain) forms the basis of morality should
be invoked rather than a narrower understanding that relies on a fixed,
54 ‘‘There is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of
the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher
value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation.’’ Mill, ‘‘Utilitarianism,’’ 211.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid, 212; Godwin, Political Justice, 299.
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hedonistic understanding of the pleasure at stake. There are no historical
or philosophical grounds to endorse the narrow, hedonistic understanding.
THE CASE AGAINST A UTILITARIAN INTERPRETATION:
(2) THE ARGUMENT FROM PROLEPSIS
In Godwin’s Political Justice Mark Philp offers a comprehensive case
against Godwin’s place in the utilitarian tradition, which is comprised of
four arguments. His first argument is that Godwin is not an act-utilitarian
and to support this he cites various aspects of his thought, including the
objective, qualitative conception of happiness. He notes that ‘‘when com-
mentators claim that Godwin is a utilitarian they mean that he holds that
pleasure defines the good to be pursued, and that we ought to do whatever
maximises the quantity of that good.’’57 As Philp points out, this view is
false because Godwin is not a hedonist interested solely in the quantity of
pleasure: he is not a utilitarian in this sense, a sense in which some earlier
commentators seem to have read him. Even more crucially, as Philp points
out, central to Godwin’s thought is the commitment to an inviolable ‘‘right
to private judgement,’’ which guarantees individuals a certain sphere of
freedom that Benthamite act-utilitarianism cannot.58 There cannot be a suc-
cessful act-utilitarian interpretation of Godwin.
Philp’s three other arguments are directed against a rule-utilitarian
reading of Political Justice, a reading that could comfortably accommodate
both the qualitative conception of happiness and the inviolable right to
private judgment. First, Philp contends that ‘‘even if we find it helpful to
characterise Godwin in this complex way, we have no ground for claiming
that he was trying to advance this complex form of utilitarianism’’ because
it is ‘‘just too sophisticated for this period.’’59 Second, he argues that ‘‘God-
win’s position is not adequately represented by this complex utilitarianism
if he values other goods or ends than pleasure’’ and ‘‘does not value them
solely for the pleasure they produce.’’60 Third, he claims that Godwin col-
lapses the means of achieving pleasure into the ends it embodies, which
means ‘‘there is no way to describe the pleasures of wisdom independently
57 Philp, Godwin’s Political Justice, 83.
58 See, for example, Godwin, Political Justice, 193–97. For discussion, see Robert Lamb
‘‘William Godwin on the Morality of Freedom,’’ History of Political Thought 28 (2007):
661–77.
59 Philp, Godwin’s Political Justice, 84.
60 Ibid.
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of the wisdom itself’’ and therefore ‘‘the value sought becomes a state of
cognition, not a state of desire satisfaction or pleasurable sensations.’’61
Though distinct, Philp’s second and third arguments against a rule-
utilitarian interpretation make substantively the same point: that Godwin’s
theory values goods or ends that are non-hedonistic, such as the acquisition
of certain cognitive states. Both are undoubtedly true. However, these
would only necessarily threaten a rule-utilitarian interpretation if it were
accepted that one must be a strict hedonist in order to be a utilitarian,
which, as noted above in reference to the claims advanced by Priestly, seems
to be vulnerable to charges of an assumed and unjustifiable essentialism.
As noted, utilitarianism is—in both historical and contemporary terms—a
complex doctrine, one that has developed over time and there does not
seem any compelling reason to exclude non-hedonistic versions. For God-
win, as well as for Mill, the development of the intellect cannot be prised
apart from pleasurable experience, as it is constitutive of the higher or sec-
ondary pleasures. It does not therefore seem crucial that Godwin prefers
human intellectual development to pleasure, when his definition of true,
objective pleasure is human intellectual development. It can be argued that
this definition of happiness is philosophically unsatisfactory by virtue of its
apparent circularity, but that circularity need not prevent it from being a
utilitarian definition. So Philp’s second and third arguments against a rule-
utilitarian interpretation seem vulnerable to the same criticisms as Priestly’s
claim about non-hedonistic utilitarian theories.
But Philp’s first argument against a rule-utilitarian reading is quite dif-
ferent and concerns a suggestion of anachronism; that modern commenta-
tors have thrust upon Godwin’s political theory a conceptual category that
was simply not available to him at the time of writing. The sort of complex
theory Godwin appears to be defending cannot be utilitarian as it is ‘‘too
sophisticated for the period’’; it would be historically unsound to credit him
with a theory of such complexity because such complexity did not yet exist.
Philp suggests that ‘‘we can only accept this complex utilitarianism as de-
scribing the core moral doctrine of Political Justice if there is no alternative
account of its coherence, or if any alternative account is equally lacking in
contextual support.’’62 Philp’s alternative account locates Godwin’s politi-
cal writings in the tradition of Rational Dissent—to which his ideas, espe-
cially his defense of the pivotal ‘‘right to private judgement,’’ were hugely
indebted—and, on this basis claims his political theory is best described
61 Ibid, 87.
62 Ibid, 84.
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as a form of non-utilitarian ‘‘perfectionism.’’63 Philp’s detailed analysis of
Godwin’s perfectionism and his debt to Rational Dissent is certainly com-
pelling. But what is less compelling is his auxiliary thesis that the ascription
of perfectionism somehow rules out utilitarianism; that his educational im-
mersion in and belonging to a perfectionist tradition somehow prevents his
articulation of a utilitarian theory.
Philp’s rejection of a utilitarian reading of Political Justice seems to be
grounded, in part, in a methodological concern about what Quentin Skin-
ner has termed the ‘‘mythology of prolepsis.’’64 Skinner describes this myth
as the ‘‘conflation of the asymmetry between the significance an observer
may justifiably claim to find in a given historical episode and the meaning
of that episode itself’’ and he illustrates his point through a discussion of
the political thought of John Locke.65 He suggests that although Locke is
commonly and plausibly interpreted as ‘‘one of the founders of the modern
empirical and liberal school of political thought,’’ this claim often becomes
‘‘elided into the claim that Locke was himself a ‘liberal’ political theorist.’’66
According to Skinner, this latter claim is simply implausible, because
‘‘Locke can scarcely have intended to contribute to a school of political
philosophy which, so this interpretation suggests, it was his great achieve-
ment to have made possible.’’67 Skinner’s argument is, then, that any de-
scription of Locke as a ‘‘liberal’’ political theorist ignores the real meaning
of his political writing. The reason that we know this is because the inten-
tion we ascribe to him (that of wishing to advance a liberal theory) was
unavailable to him at his time of writing. One cannot seemingly intend
one’s writings to contribute to a tradition that does not exist and, therefore,
Locke cannot plausibly be described as a ‘‘liberal’’ political theorist.
Skinner’s suggestion has serious implications for interpretations of
Godwin and for the history of utilitarian political thought in general be-
cause it reduces the meaning of concepts held by historical thinkers to the
linguistic resources at their disposal. The lesson from Skinner’s example
would seem to be that should the term ‘‘utilitarian’’ be absent from a think-
er’s vocabulary—and thereby unavailable for deployment—then she cannot
63 Ibid, 80–98.
64 Philp acknowledges the influence of Skinner’s methodological writings for his reading
of Godwin. See Godwin’s Political Justice, Appendix E, 253–54.
65 Quentin Skinner, ‘‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,’’ Visions of
Politics, Volume I: Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
73.
66 Ibid, 74.
67 Ibid.
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be deemed to be part of the utilitarian tradition. It would thus pose insur-
mountable problems for a utilitarian interpretation of Godwin: he definitely
could not have intended to be a ‘‘utilitarian’’ in this sense because the term
utilitarian was not in existence at the time of writing. It did not become a
popularly recognizable term used to describe individuals or a movement
until well into the nineteenth century.68 How, then, could Godwin intend
to advance a utilitarian theory when such an intention was not actually
available to him at the time of writing?
Skinner introduces some empirical tests that can be applied to an inter-
pretation to ensure that it avoids any mythology of prolepsis, which include
(i) that B is known to have studied A’s works; (ii) that B could not
have found the relevant doctrines in any writer other than A; and
(iii) that B could not have arrived at the relevant doctrines inde-
pendently.69
If Godwin were B, then, presumably in order for him to be considered a
utilitarian, A would have to be Bentham (or any of the other figures re-
garded as the founders of the doctrine). As already noted, there is absolutely
no evidence to suggest that Godwin read Bentham, so he fails the test (i). If
(and only if) Bentham were viewed as the first thinker to offer a systemati-
cally utilitarian moral theory, then Godwin would likewise fail test (ii).
However, it seems impossible to find any reasons to suggest that Godwin
must fail test (iii). As discussed, there is no doubt that utilitarianism was
emerging as a moral theory by the late eighteenth century; after all, it did
emerge in the writings of Bentham. There does not appear to be any com-
pelling reason to believe that a theory of the same species was not indepen-
dently formulated by Godwin and the fact that the two figures offer
different formulations provides no basis for granting one of them utilitarian
status but not the other. Moreover, describing Godwin’s political theory as
utilitarian does not threaten Philp’s claim about its ‘‘perfectionist’’ basis in
Rational Dissent. Utilitarianism can be seen to account for what the theory
approximates as a theory and perfectionism indicates the sources from
which it is comprised and there is no reason to suppose that a utilitarian
sum cannot be made up of perfectionist parts.
68 Though the term was apparently first used by Bentham in a letter in 1781, it did not
become currency until much later, such that Mill thought he had invented it. See Mary
Warnock ‘‘Introduction’’ in J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Essay on Bentham
(Glasgow: Fontana, 1962), 9.
69 Skinner, ‘‘Meaning and Understanding,’’ 75–76.
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But even were Godwin to fail to satisfy the empirical tests identified
above, the way in which Skinner presents the problem of prolepsis is actu-
ally problematic and it should not really provide an obstacle to a utilitarian
reading. For one thing, it invites some deeply counter-intuitive interpretive
conclusions. It would, for instance, seem to entail that we cannot regard
even Bentham as a utilitarian, because of the non-existence of utilitarianism
at his time of writing. But this seems completely wrong, since Bentham’s
entire political theory was founded on his ‘‘greatest happiness principle,’’
based on calculations of individual ‘‘utility.’’ It seems strange to suggest
that simply because Bentham was the philosophical founder of utilitarian-
ism he could not have meant to advance a utilitarian theory. In his act of
being the first person to offer a systematic utilitarian argument, he was also,
surely, himself offering a utilitarian argument. Bentham’s argument simply
is utilitarian and therefore he can be accurately described as a utilitarian
thinker.
But more serious than any conflict with our interpretive intuitions is
that Skinner’s characterization of the problem of prolepsis actually trades
on both a dubious representation of the way to understand the meaning of
a past work and an erroneous understanding of the relationship between
the concepts held by a person and the language used to express those con-
cepts. His claim seems at first to rely purely on the intuitively plausible
notion that an agent is incapable of holding a belief that can be empirically
established as unavailable to that individual at the time of writing: that it
would be completely wrong to suggest that Locke, say, had a favorite ‘‘Roll-
ing Stones’’ album. But it actually relies on far more than this. The argu-
ment is concerned with a species of anachronism: the suggestion is that that
the correct ascription of concepts to historical individuals depends on those
concepts being identifiable as existing at the time of an author’s writing and
hence available for her use. Skinner’s concern with this particular sort of
anachronism can be separated out into two distinct claims: (1) that grasping
the meaning of text depends on being sure of its performative nature (thus,
Locke cannot be a liberal, nor Godwin a utilitarian because they cannot
have meant to intend their writings to be such); and (2) that determining
historical meaning depends on the linguistic resources available to the au-
thor in question (thus, Locke cannot be a liberal, nor Godwin a utilitarian
because they were unable to frame their concepts in a certain linguistic
fashion).
Both claims are suspect. The first claim about performativity relies on
a certain understanding of the meaning of a work: that it must be under-
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stood as a form of action intended by an agent rather than as an expression
of that agent’s beliefs. But, as Mark Bevir points out, if it is accepted that
the meaning of an action is comprised of the beliefs held by an individual,
the object of study must shift to the beliefs represented by the action rather
than any concern with either illocutionary force (understood as the purpose
of the text as speech-act) or pro-attitudes (understood as the desire for a
certain state of affairs to be brought about).70 The question of whether or
not Godwin intended to contribute to (or establish) a certain tradition of
political theorizing can be reduced to questions about his beliefs but re-
duced no further than this. So, in this case, the focus shifts from the ques-
tion of whether or not Godwin was intending to contribute to the utilitarian
tradition in Political Justice to the question of whether the beliefs expressed
in that text are utilitarian. The effect of this shift is to undermine any ques-
tion of whether or not Godwin intended his action to contribute to a certain
tradition, which becomes irrelevant to the meaning of the work. As shown,
there is no dispute that the core belief that Godwin wished to express in
that text was that morality consisted of the promotion of pleasure at the
expense of pain and which was identified earlier as the broadly understood
property essential to utilitarian theories. So, once the interpretive concern
shifts from attention to individual intentions understood as motives to per-
form, to attention to intentionality understood as beliefs, describing God-
win as a utilitarian becomes plausible.
The only way then for Skinner to maintain that a problem of prolepsis
remains to render such a description misleading would be for him to en-
dorse a certain understanding of the relationship between concepts and the
languages used to express those concepts. He could claim that because con-
cepts are necessarily parasitic on language, to express a belief in X it is
necessary for there to be an existing linguistic concept of ‘‘X’’ to express a
belief in. So, in this case of a linguistic ‘‘accessibility principle,’’71 the term
‘‘utilitarian’’ would have to exist in order for Godwin’s beliefs to be de-
scribable as such. And, because the term did not actually come into exis-
tence until the early nineteenth century, the problem of prolepsis remains:
Godwin cannot express a belief in something that does not yet exist. This
seems in fact what Philp has in mind in the case of Godwin. His rejection
of a utilitarian interpretation and his positing of a perfectionist alternative
70 See Mark Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999), 129–42.
71 Gad Prudovsky, ‘‘Can we ascribe to past thinkers concepts they had no linguistic means
to express?,’’ History and Theory 36 (1997): 15–31, at 24.
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apply mainly to the first, 1793 edition of Political Justice and he suggests
that that by the second, 1795 edition ‘‘there are no longer sufficient grounds
for rejecting [a complex] utilitarian interpretation . . . in favour of a perfec-
tionist account.’’72 Yet he nevertheless does imply such a utilitarian reading
remains problematic. He maintains that in the case of the second and third
editions, ‘‘describing him in [utilitarian] terms is a little odd’’ since ‘‘he
can hardly be said to offer this sophisticated form of utilitarianism as a
sophisticated form of utilitarianism.’’73 This is undoubtedly correct, in the
sense that it cannot be claimed that Godwin himself could have character-
ized his writing as ‘‘utilitarian.’’
But this claim is also mistaken as it depends on a faulty theory of his-
torical meaning. It rests ultimately on a concern with linguistic meaning
rather than about hermeneutic meaning: it suggests that the meaning of
Godwin’s utterance can be gained from considering simply what the words
he used meant conventionally, rather than the individual viewpoint he
wished to express in using those words.74 So, even though the view that
‘‘justice is served by the generation of human happiness, understood in
qualitative terms’’ can be attributed to Godwin, the claim is that this view
did not have any link to being a utilitarian in a conventional sense, because
the particular convention of wishing to be a utilitarian was not available to
authors writing at that time. But when reading Political Justice, hermeneu-
tic interpretation requires attention not simply to what Godwin’s words
mean in a linguistic sense, but rather what he intended them to mean; in
other words, the beliefs that they provide evidence of. What Godwin meant
in Political Justice cannot simply be read off from existing linguistic con-
ventions, because such a reading off only provides evidence of the existence
of conventional meaning, not the meaning of his ideas expressed in that
work.
CONCLUSION
Godwin’s contemporaries seem to have been quite well aware of the utili-
tarian foundations of his political thought. Coleridge, in his sonnet, ‘‘To
William Godwin,’’ declared
72 Philp, Godwin’s Political Justice, 157.
73 Ibid, 159.
74 See Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas, especially 31–52 for a separation of lin-
guistic from hermeneutic meaning and for the limited relevance of the former to historical
interpretation.
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And hymn thee, GODWIN! with an ardent lay;
For that thy voice, in Passion’s stormy day,
When wild I roam’d the bleak Heath of Distress,
Bade the bright form of Justice meet my way—
And told me that her name was HAPPINESS.75
Whether or not Coleridge was actually able to refer linguistically to God-
win’s political thought as ‘‘utilitarian’’ does not seem relevant to the ques-
tion of whether he thought Godwin was a utilitarian. The important point
would seem to be that Coleridge recognizes that, for Godwin, the basis of
justice is human happiness. The aim of this article has been to go some way
towards remaking the case for a utilitarian reading of Godwin’s Political
Justice, through both textual evidence that indicates the nature of his moral
theory and reasons to reject textual and contextual cases against such a
reading. Though the history of utilitarianism is less than straightforward, it
is widely agreed that it is a tradition that emerged in the eighteenth century.
There are plenty of figures in the early and mid-eighteenth century who
have been, on occasions, described as utilitarians, including Hutcheson and
Hume. Even if such claims are representative of over-interpretation, the
language of utility was definitely an increasing part of political discourse by
the late eighteenth century. Even if Bentham were the first person to rigor-
ously apply utilitarianism as a moral and political principle, Godwin’s Po-
litical Justice can plausibly be viewed as a contemporaneous version of the
doctrine, which incorporates a qualitative dimension usually cited as a
nineteenth century innovation offered by Mill. Godwin’s claim to be con-
sidered an important part of the utilitarian tradition remains unthreatened
by this qualitative element; indeed, if anything, it should really serve to
highlight his unique importance in its development.
University of Exeter.
75 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ‘‘To William Godwin, Author of ‘Political Justice,’ ’’ cited in
Locke, A Fantasy of Reason, 88.
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